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ABSTRACT 
The epistemology of intuitions has become popular recently with philosophers’ increas-
ing use of experimental methods to study intuitions. Philosophers have focused on the reliability 
of intuitions, as empirical studies seem to suggest that conflicting intuitions are common. One 
set of studies, concerning what Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) calls the abstract/concrete paradox, 
suggests that conflicting intuitions are common and, hence, that mistaken intuitions are com-
mon. As Goldman (2007) notes, if mistaken intuitions are sufficiently prevalent, then we might 
have reason to think intuitions are unreliable. I argue that mistaken intuitions are not common, 
since studies concerning the abstract/concrete paradox have unknowingly studied several dis-
tinct phenomena instead of the abstract/concrete paradox and, hence, that they present merely 
apparently conflicting intuitions. I then discuss the import of empirical studies for debates about 
reliability, noting that those studies can inform us about the unreliability of intuitions but we are 
still unclear about the conditions for reliability. 
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1 INTUITIONS AND RELIABILITY  
Intuitions have received a fair amount of attention in the philosophical literature recently. 
An increasing interest in intuitions should not be surprising, since philosophers have long ap-
pealed to what seems intuitively correct as a source of evidence. More specifically, intuitions are 
often thought of as a source of foundational evidence—as Alexander and Weinberg note, “intui-
tions provide a noninferential, defeasible justificatory foundation in at least the following way: a 
person may appeal to an intuition as evidence without having to provide further evidence for the 
intuition” (2012; p. 2; my emphasis). Thus, a claim that is intuitive has prima facie support, while 
we have prima facie support against counterintuitive claims (see, e.g., Goldman 1986, p. 66). 
For examples, appeals to intuitions can be found in debates about utilitarianism and consequen-
tialism (Thompson 1971; Singer 1972), epistemology (Gettier 1963), personal identity (Parfit 
1986), the relation of the mind and brain (Chalmers 1996; Jackson 1982; 1986), and free will 
and moral responsibility (Frankfurt 1969; van Inwagen 1983). Some philosophers even consider 
appeal to intuition to be distinctive of philosophical methodology (Jackson 1998; Goldman 2007; 
2010).  
It is clear that, as Alvin Goldman says, intuitions play a “critical role” in philosophical 
practice (2007, p. 1). Recently, however, interest in the epistemology of intuition itself has 
grown. The increasing popularity of the epistemology of intuition can be loosely traced through 
early work of Stich (1988; 1990) and the papers in the 1998 Rethinking Intuition anthology. Most 
recently the epistemology of intuitions has been widely discussed within some areas of the ex-
perimental philosophy program, wherein philosophers conduct empirical studies surveying peo-
ple’s intuitions about various cases and thought experiments concerned with philosophical is-
sues.  
2 
Many issues concerning the epistemology of intuition have arisen throughout these 
works. For example, some theorists have focused on the nature of intuitions: What is the con-
tent of intuitions (Sosa 2006; Lynch 2006)? Are there different kinds of intuitions (Bealer 1998; 
Jackson 1998)? Other theorists have asked about the source and status of intuitions: Is there a 
distinct intuitive faculty (e.g., Hales 2012)? What is the epistemic status of intuitions (Pust 2000; 
Alexander and Weinberg 2007; Goldman 2007)? Are intuitions reliable (Goldman 2007; 2010; 
Liao 2008)? This latter group of questions has been addressed in detail lately by proponents of 
the “negative” branch of the experimental philosophy program. Proponents of the negative 
branch1 believe that recent experimental findings undermine the epistemic status of intuitions by 
showing that they are unstable and overly sensitive to seemingly irrelevant factors such as the 
socioeconomic status of the intuiter (Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich 2001), presentation order of 
cases (Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg 2008), and the affective content of the intuition-eliciting 
case (Nichols and Knobe 2007). Based upon recent experimental findings, proponents of the 
negative branch conclude that we have reason to doubt the epistemic status of intuitions (Wein-
berg, Nichols, and Stich 2001; Alexander and Weinberg 2007; Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg 
2008). 
An important issue that has received much attention recently within the negative branch 
of experimental philosophy and in the epistemology of intuition more generally is reliability. We 
need to know if our intuitions are reliable or not. This is important for philosophers in many dif-
ferent areas of philosophy, since intuitions are commonly appealed to in many different areas. 
Furthermore, debates about reliability have been reinvigorated recently as more and more ex-
perimental studies of intuitions about philosophical issues have been conducted. In later sec-
                                                             
1
 The negative branch of experimental philosophy can be contrasted with the positive branch, wherein 
experimental philosophy is viewed as a complement to armchair philosophical methodology, not as a re-
placement of armchair methodology. See Alexander and Weinberg (2007) and Alexander, Mallon, and 
Weinberg (2010) for a fuller discussion of the differences between the positive and negative programs of 
experimental philosophy. See also Nadelhoffer and Nahmias (2007) for discussion of three distinct pro-
jects within experimental philosophy. 
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tions of the paper I will discuss some of those studies and what they tell us about the reliability 
of intuitions. It will be helpful to briefly review challenges to reliability first. 
 According to Goldman (2007), there are two general types of challenges to the reliability 
of intuition. First, skeptics about intuition have argued that since people frequently have conflict-
ing intuitions—and one of the two conflicting intuitions must be wrong—the percentage of intui-
tions that are wrong is unreasonably high such that we cannot claim that intuition is reliable. Se-
cond, intuitions cannot be used as evidence unless they have been calibrated. According to 
Weinberg, Crowley, Gonnerman, and Vandewalker (2012), “Calibration is a process of regulat-
ing a putative source of evidence, by inspecting it and, if needed, adjusting it to render it accu-
rate” (260). The process of calibration involves testing the putative source of evidence and cor-
roborating it against a trusted, independent procedure or source of evidence. However, accord-
ing to Cummins (1998), we have no such independent procedure with which to corroborate in-
tuitions.2 Thus, it is impossible to calibrate intuitions and, hence, we cannot know whether intui-
tions are reliable or not (Cummins 1998). 
The calibration challenge to the reliability of intuition can be blocked—that is, shown to 
be only an apparent challenge while not in fact challenging reliability—by appealing to the anal-
ogous case of memory as a putative source of evidence (Alston 1993; Goldman 2007). Memory 
is our basic way of forming true beliefs about the past, and all other ways of accessing facts 
about the past depend upon memory. Thus, we have no independent procedure for calibrating 
memory. But claiming that memory is unreliable risks general skepticism, so a lack of independ-
ent procedure for calibration cannot be used to challenge the reliability of intuition. Some 
sources of evidence may not require calibration, and intuition may be one of those sources 
(Goldman 2007, p. 5). Instead, Goldman suggests that we substitute independent calibration for 
                                                             
2
 As Cummins notes, if such an independent procedure did exist, there would be no use for intuitions. For 
if we had a trusted, non-intuitive procedure to calibrate intuitions against, we would already have access 
to the relevant facts of the domain for which intuitions are intended to be used (1998, p. 117-18). 
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a weaker condition on something to serve as evidence, namely, “that we not be justified in be-
lieving that the putative source is unreliable” (2007, p. 5; emphasis original).  
With the calibration challenge blocked, the best challenge available left to skeptics of the 
reliability of intuitions concerns conflicting intuitions. If there are conflicting intuitions about some 
phenomenon—i.e., two individuals3 each having a single intuition that conflicts with the other 
person’s intuition about the same phenomenon—then one of those intuitions must be wrong 
(Goldman 2007).4 Thus, if conflicting intuitions are common, then wrong intuitions are common 
as well. This challenge to the reliability of intuition therefore turns on an empirical question—are 
conflicting intuitions prevalent?5 A positive answer favors the skeptic about the reliability of intui-
tions. A negative answer favors the proponent of appeals to intuition as evidence.  To address 
this challenge, we must look at empirical studies of intuitions about hypothetical cases concern-
ing philosophical issues in order to answer whether conflicting intuitions are prevalent or not. 
In the next section I will review a series of empirical studies looking at people’s judg-
ments of moral responsibility, free will, and related concepts. This particular set of studies will be 
helpful for discussions about reliability since these studies have uncovered what appears to be 
a large set of conflicting intuitions. If conflicting intuitions are as prevalent as these studies seem 
to suggest, then the challenge to reliability of intuitions from conflicting intuitions seems to be 
                                                             
3
 We can distinguish conflicting intuitions between two individuals and conflicting intuitions within the 
same individual. In the latter case, for example, someone might think both that abortion is permissible and 
that abortion is not permissible (Liao 2008). Since the experimental studies I discuss later in the paper all 
concern comparisons of intuitions between different individuals, my discussion hereafter will not be tar-
geted at conflicting intuitions within the same individual. 
4
 Here “conflicting intuitions” refer to what Liao calls Genuine Conflicts—a conflict that “seem to remain 
after possible verbal disagreements and considerations of partiality, clouded emotions, mistaken heuris-
tics, and so on, have been taken into account” (2008; p. 259). In the case of a Genuine Conflict, two indi-
viduals possess the same facts about some phenomenon but appear to interpret those facts in different 
ways; there are no additional facts to consider. Intuitions that seemingly conflict but are the result of fac-
tors such as partiality or verbal disagreements do not constitute a Genuine Conflict but only an Apparent 
Conflict (Liao 2008; p. 259). Only in the case of a Genuine Conflict must one of the conflicting intuitions 
be mistaken. Throughout the rest of the paper, I will use “conflicting intuitions” in the sense of Liao’s Gen-
uine Conflicts. 
5
 It is unclear how prevalent conflicting intuitions need to be in order for this challenge to be a serious 
threat to the reliability of intuitions. Ultimately, my discussion will suggest that conflicting intuitions are not 
very prevalent at all in the recent experimental philosophy literature, and I will not try to say how prevalent 
conflicting intuitions would been to be for this challenge to reliability to succeed. 
5 
correct. However, I will argue that the studies have not uncovered conflicting intuitions, since 
these studies have involved several different phenomena. Thus, the conflicting intuitions of the-
se studies are only apparent conflicts and, therefore, these studies have not shown that intui-
tions are unreliable.6 The upshot here is important for all philosophers interested in issues con-
cerning the reliability of intuitions. For to show that a set of intuitions are unreliable, we must 
show that those intuitions constitute genuine conflicts, where two individuals possess the same 
facts of the matter but interpret them in different ways. But if two or more studies purporting to 
study intuitions about the same phenomenon actually look at intuitions about different phenom-
ena, then there can be no genuine conflicts. Since experimental studies play an increasingly 
larger role in the epistemology of intuitions, philosophers must be increasingly careful in con-
structing survey materials and interpreting the results of those surveys to ensure that the intui-
tions studied concern the targeted phenomenon. 
2 THE ABSTRACT/CONCRETE PARADOX 
In this section I will review of handful of recent studies concerning non-philosophers’ in-
tuitions about free will, moral responsibility, and related concepts. Collectively, these studies 
have found that people’s intuitions about free will, moral responsibility, knowledge, and other 
concepts apparently vary with respect to how “abstractly” or “concretely” a hypothetical case is 
described (Nichols and Knobe 2007; Nahmias, Coates, and Kvaran 2007; Sinnott-Armstrong 
2008; Roskies and Nichols 2008; de Brigard, Mandelbaum, and Ripley 2009; Freiman and 
Nichols 2011; Mandelbaum and Ripley ms). In this section I will follow Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) 
in referring to this collection of results as the abstract/concrete paradox, though below I will ar-
                                                             
6
 I do not want to claim that these studies show, or even suggest, that intuitions are reliable. Debates 
about the reliability of intuitions are often framed in terms of unreliability, with theorists arguing either that 
intuitions are unreliable or that intuitions are not unreliable (see, e.g., Cummins 1998; Goldman 2007; 
2010; Weinberg et al. 2012), and I will do the same in this paper.  
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gue that the various studies ostensibly concerning the abstract/concrete paradox actually con-
cern several different phenomena (and, hence, that the handful of proposed unifying explana-
tions of the abstract/concrete paradox are all mistaken). Thus, to be clear, I do not think the ab-
stract/concrete paradox tracks a single phenomenon, nor do I believe there is a good way to 
distinguish between abstract cases and concrete cases. However, to make my case for those 
claims I must first review the studies and results (this section), proposed explanations of the 
paradox (section 3), and then critically examine those explanations (section 4). Sections 2-4 
pave the way for my general critique of the abstract/concrete literature (section 5), and I then 
discuss the implications of my critique for arguments about the reliability of intuition in section 6. 
Before reviewing the empirical studies, it will be helpful to clarify the relevant terminolo-
gy. The abstract/concrete paradox refers to the finding that non-philosophers tend to attribute 
responsibility, free will, knowledge, and desert to agents in concrete cases, while they tend to 
not attribute responsibility, free will, knowledge, or desert to agents in abstract cases even 
though, according to Mandelbaum and Ripley, “both cases might describe an identical action in 
an identical situation—the only difference is that the cases aren’t identically described” (ms; p. 
1). Philosophers have defined concreteness in several different ways. Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) 
claims that concreteness can refer to specific stimuli (as opposed to general stimuli) or particu-
lar stimuli (as opposed to universal stimuli). De Brigard, Mandelbaum, and Ripley (2009) say 
that a case can be abstract if the action performed by the agent in the case is unspecified.  
Freiman and Nichols follow Sinnott-Armstrong, claiming that a case is concrete if it mentions 
one or more specific agents and referring the reader to Sinnott-Armstrong for “further discussion 
on the significance of the abstract/concrete distinction” (2011; fn. 35). And Mandelbaum and 
Ripley state, “What concreteness is varies from case to case: sometimes it amounts to describ-
ing in more detail an action that had previously been left undescribed; sometimes asking about 
a particular case instead of a general case; sometimes asking about an action happening in our 
7 
world vs. one in an alternate universe; sometimes something else” (ms; p.1). We can now turn 
to the studies themselves. 
Nichols and Knobe (2007) 
To investigate folk judgments about the compatibility of determinism and moral respon-
sibility, Nichols and Knobe (2007) gave non-philosophers the following materials: 
 
Imagine a universe (Universe A) in which everything that happens is completely 
caused by whatever happened before it. This is true from the very beginning of the 
universe, so what happened in the beginning of the universe caused what happened 
next, and so on right up until the present. For example one day John decided to 
have French Fries at lunch. Like everything else, this decision was completely 
caused by what happened before it. So, if everything in this universe was exactly 
the same up until John made his decision, then it had to happen that John would 
decide to have French Fries.  
 
Now imagine a universe (Universe B) in which almost everything that happens is 
completely caused by whatever happened before it. The one exception is human 
decision making. For example, one day Mary decided to have French Fries at lunch. 
Since a person’s decision in this universe is not completely caused by what hap-
pened before it, even if everything in the universe was exactly the same up until 
Mary made her decision, it did not have to happen that Mary would decide to have 
French Fries. She could have decided to have something different.  
 
The key difference, then, is that in Universe A every decision is completely caused 
by what happened before the decision – given the past, each decision has to hap-
pen the way that it does. By contrast, in Universe B, decisions are not completely 
caused by the past, and each human decision does not have to happen the way 
that it does.  
 
Half the people in the study were randomly assigned to the abstract condition and re-
ceived the following question: 
 
In Universe A, is it possible for a person to be fully morally responsible for their ac-
tions?  
 
YES    NO 
 
The other half of the subjects were in the concrete condition and read this question: 
 
In Universe A, a man named Bill has become attracted to his secretary, and he de-
cides that the only way to be with her is to kill his wife and 3 children. He knows that 
it is impossible to escape from his house in the event of a fire. Before he leaves on a 
business trip, he sets up a device in his basement that burns down the house and 
kills his family.  
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Is Bill fully morally responsible for killing his wife and children?  
 
YES    NO  
 
In the concrete condition, 86% answered “Yes,” while only 14% answered “Yes” in the 
abstract condition. According to Mandelbaum and Ripley (ms) and Freiman and Nichols (2011), 
the concrete condition is concrete because it mentions a specific action performed by the agent 
in the scenario. Similarly, Sinnott-Armstrong says that the abstract condition is abstract because 
it “does not mention any particular person or act or victim or time or place.” In contrast, he 
claims that the concrete condition is concrete because it “does mention a particular agent, vic-
tims, and act” (2008; p. 214).  
Nahmias, Coates, Kvaran (2007) 
Nahmias, Coates, and Kvaran (2007) ran several experiments to test whether judgments 
about moral responsibility, free will, and related concepts shift according to the abstractness or 
concreteness of the case. Participants in the Abstract condition received the following case: 
Story: On Erta, the landscape and life are very similar to Earth, and there are ad-
vanced life forms called Ertans who look, talk, and behave very much like we do. 
For instance, the Ertans have families, schools, various jobs, parties, arguments, 
etc. However, the Ertans’ science has advanced far beyond ours. Specifically, Ertan 
psychologists have discovered exactly how Ertans’ minds work. For instance, they 
have discovered that whenever an Ertan is trying to decide what to do, the decision 
the Ertan ends up making is completely caused by the specific thoughts, desires, 
and plans occurring in his or her mind. The psychologists have also discovered that 
these thoughts, desires, and plans are completely caused by the Ertan’s current sit-
uation and the earlier events in his or her life. These earlier events were also com-
pletely caused by even earlier events, eventually going all the way back to events 
that occurred before the Ertan was born. 
 
So, once specific earlier events have occurred in an Ertan’s life, these events will 
definitely cause specific later events to occur. For instance, once specific thoughts, 
desires, and plans occur in the Ertan’s mind, they will definitely cause the Ertan to 
make the specific decision he or she makes. 
 
Other participants were assigned to either a Good condition or Bad condition. Both con-
ditions were different from the Abstract condition in that a specific agent and specific action is 
mentioned. Mandelbaum and Ripley claim that the two scenario pairs, Abstract/Good and Ab-
9 
stract/Bad, are both instances of the abstract/concrete paradox since Good and Bad mention 
specific agents and specific actions while Abstract does not (ms; p. 4). Moreover, Nahmias et al. 
note that they created and tested Good and Bad conditions because they “were . . . interested in 
replicating and examining Nichols and Knobe’s ﬁnding that people’s judgments are signiﬁcantly 
inﬂuenced by the presentation of concrete agents performing morally salient actions“ (2007; p. 
223). Both Good and Bad groups received the same case as people in the Abstract condition, 
except that the last paragraph was replaced with one of the following (Bad condition shown; 
Good condition in brackets): 
 
So, once specific earlier events have occurred in an Ertan’s life, these events will 
definitely cause specific later events to occur. For example, one day an Ertan 
named Smit decides to kill his wife so that he can marry his lover [donate a large 
sum of money to an orphanage in his community], and he does it. Once the spe-
cific thoughts, desires, and plans occur in Smit’s mind, they will definitely cause 
his decision to kill his wife [donate a large sum of money to an orphanage in his 
community]. 
 
Compared to judgments of responsibility, free will, praise, and blame in the Abstract condition, 
those same judgments were significantly higher in the Good and Bad conditions, which both 
mention specific agents performing specific actions (Nahmias et al. 2007; p. 234). 
Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) 
 
Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) ran a study to investigate abstract/concrete differences with 
respect to judgments of knowledge. Half the survey participants received the following case and 
question: 
People sometimes believe things for no good reason. For example, people 
sometimes believe what a politician says about the economy when they have no 
good reason to trust what the politician says. Our question is about knowledge: If 
you cannot give any good reason to believe that the person whom you believe to 
be your mother really is your mother, is it possible that you know that she is your 
mother? 
 
The other half of participants received the same case but with a different question: 
[All same up to the colon, then new question]: If a person cannot give any good 
reason to believe a claim, is it possible that the person knows that the claim is 
correct? 
10 
 
In the study, 88% of participants in the concrete condition said Yes, while only 52% of 
participants in the abstract condition said Yes. Sinnott-Armstrong refers to the second case as 
an “abstract question” (2008; p. 220) and contrasts it with “a more concrete version” in the first 
case (p. 221). Although he does not explicitly state what he thinks make the first case the “more 
concrete version” than the “abstract question” in the second case, he does note that the terms 
abstract and concrete can refer to general stimuli and specific stimuli, respectively (p. 226; fn. 
1). Thus, presumably, the first case is concrete because it mentions a specific person—your 
mother—while the second case is abstract because it mentions only a general, unspecified per-
son. 
Roskies and Nichols (2008) 
Roskies and Nichols (2008) were curious about the role of setting in the production of 
judgments about moral responsibility. Nichols and Knobe’s cases were set in an alternate un i-
verse, but other studies used scenarios set in our world (e.g., Nahmias et al. 2006). Roskies 
and Nichols found that judgments about moral responsibility, free choice, and desert in a deter-
ministic universe can vary according to the setting of the scenario, either our world or an alter-
nate world. Half of their survey participants were assigned to the Actual condition and read the 
following case: 
Many eminent scientists have become convinced that every decision a person 
makes is completely caused by what happened before the decision – given the 
past, each decision has to happen the way that it does. These scientists think 
that a person’s decision is always an inevitable result of their genetic makeup 
combined with environmental influences. So if a person decides to commit a 
crime, this can always be explained as a result of past influences. Any individual 
who had the same genetic makeup and the same environmental influences 
would have decided exactly the same thing. This is because a person’s decision 
is always completely caused by what happened in the past. 
 
In the Alternate condition, participants received the same scenario preceded by the following: 
 
Imagine an alternate universe, Universe A, that is much like earth. But in Uni-
verse A, many eminent scientists have become convinced . . .   
 
11 
Participants in both conditions were then asked about moral responsibility, blame, and free 
choice. In response to the scenario set in our world, most people said it is possible for people to 
be fully morally responsible for their actions and be morally blameworthy for committing crimes. 
In the Alternate condition, most people said it is not possible for people to be fully morally re-
sponsible or be morally blameworthy for committing crimes. Thus, judgments about moral re-
sponsibility and blame vary depending on whether the judgment-eliciting scenario is set in our 
world or an alternate world, even when all the facts about the two worlds are the same.7 Accord-
ing to Mandelbaum and Ripley (ms), these cases are an instance of the abstract/concrete para-
dox because the Alternate condition, being set in an alternate world, is more abstract than the 
case set in our world. And for Sinnott-Armstrong, “the alternate condition is much less concrete 
than the actual condition” because “when we think about the actual world, we know much more 
about it” (2008; p. 216). 
De Brigard, Mandelbaum, & Ripley (2009) 
De Brigard, Mandelbaum, and Ripley (2009) also tested abstract/concrete differences in 
judgments of moral responsibility. They conducted a study with two conditions. In the Concrete 
condition participants read the following case and answered the question following it: 
Dennis has recently found out from his doctor that he has a neurological condi-
tion that has, in the past, caused him to rape women. Were someone else to 
have this neurological condition then that person would have had to behave in 
the same ways as Dennis.  
On a scale of 1-7, 1 being not responsible, 7 being very responsible, how morally 
responsible is Dennis for raping women? 
In the Abstract condition participants read the following: 
                                                             
7
 Judgments of free will were also significantly higher in the Actual condition, though the means for both 
conditions were above the midline of responses, i.e., most people in both conditions said it was possible 
for people to make truly free choices. 
12 
Dennis has recently found out from his doctor that he has a neurological condi-
tion that has caused him to behave in certain ways. Were someone else to have 
this neurological condition then that person would have had to behave in the 
same ways as Dennis.  
On a scale of 1-7, 1 being not responsible, 7 being very responsible, how morally 
responsible is Dennis for the behaviors that are caused by his neurological condi-
tion? 
In the Abstract condition, participants held Dennis significantly less responsible than in the Con-
crete condition. De Brigard et al. claim that their second condition is abstract because the 
agent’s action was not specified. 
Freiman & Nichols (2011) 
Freiman and Nichols (2011) investigated whether an abstract/concrete difference would 
be found with judgments of fairness and desert. In their abstract condition, people read the fol-
lowing statement: 
Suppose that some people make more money solely because they have genetic 
advantages. 
 
In the concrete condition, people received the following scenario: 
Suppose that Amy and Beth both want to be professional jazz singers.  They 
both practice singing equally hard.  Although jazz singing is the greatest natural 
talent of both Amy and Beth, Beth's vocal range and articulation is naturally bet-
ter than Amy's because of differences in their genetics.  Solely as a result of this 
genetic advantage, Beth's singing is much more impressive. As a result, Beth at-
tracts bigger audiences and hence gets more money than Amy. 
 
In the concrete condition, most people said that Beth deserved the extra money and that 
it was fair that Beth got more money than Amy. However, in the abstract condition most people 
said that the people with genetic advantages did not deserve the extra money and also that it 
was not fair that those people got more money. Thus, changing only the concreteness—that is, 
whether or not one or more specific agents was mentioned—of the case resulted in a dramatic 
shift in people’s judgments about fairness and desert. 
13 
Collectively, these studies seem to suggest that there is a shift in judgments about moral 
responsibility, free will, and related concepts across abstract and concrete stimuli, where “ab-
stract” and “concrete” vary from case to case. A handful of explanations of the paradox have 
been proposed, which I will now review. 
3 POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS OF THE ABSTRACT/CONCRETE PARADOX 
In section 2 I presented a collection of experimental studies that some theorists believe 
concern a single phenomenon, the abstract/concrete paradox. Those theorists have proposed 
several explanations of the abstract/concrete paradox, which I summarize in this section. I pre-
sent these studies and explanations concerning the abstract/concrete paradox in order to pro-
vide a backdrop for my critique of the abstract/concrete literature (Sections 4 and 5), the impli-
cations of which are important for arguments about the reliability of intuitions (Section 6). Here 
are the explanations.  
Knobe and Nichols 
Nichols and Knobe (2008) offer what they call the affective performance error model. 
According to the affective performance error model, people normally use a tacit theory when 
making judgments of responsibility, but powerful affective reactions that arise in response to vio-
lations of moral norms leave people unable to correctly apply their tacit theory. Nichols and 
Knobe distinguish people’s representations of the criteria for moral responsibility and the per-
formance systems people use to apply those criteria to specific scenarios (671). Affective reac-
tions lead to performance errors in that they prevent the normal functioning of people’s perfor-
mance systems that enable them to apply their criteria of moral responsibility to particular cas-
es. 
Sinnott-Armstrong 
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Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) provides an explanation of the abstract/concrete paradox 
based on different memory systems. Following Mandelbaum and Ripley (ms), I will call Sinnott-
Armstrong’s proposal the separate capacities hypothesis. This hypothesis claims that we have 
independent mental mechanisms for encoding concrete cases and abstract cases, which lead to 
different intuitions about particular cases. Specifically, Sinnott-Armstrong invokes a well-known 
distinction between two types of memory—episodic and semantic—to explain the ab-
stract/concrete paradox. He states, “Episodic memory represents particular or specific events, 
including actions by a person. Semantic memory represents more abstract properties or general 
traits of a person” (2008; p. 222). For instance, my semantic memory of 9/11 includes a collec-
tion of facts such as “happened on September 11th, 2001” and “two planes crashed into the twin 
towers.” But my episodic memory of 9/11 includes information about my actual experience that 
day of 7th-grade history class with Mr. Lowe being moved to the library, the school being locked 
down, and my general state of confusion and unease. For Sinnott-Armstrong, concrete cases 
are represented in episodic memory which tends to produce increased attributions of responsi-
bility, while abstract cases are represented in semantic memory which tends to produce de-
creased attributions of responsibility.8 The abstract/concrete paradox arises since “these sys-
tems naturally conflict with each other, because the concrete system stores counter-instances to 
the generalizations in the abstract system” (2008; p. 222). According to Sinnott-Armstrong, the 
separate capacities hypothesis is supported by an inference to the best explanation: 
[The separate capacities hypothesis] would explain why philosophical intuitions 
are so persistent. Philosophers who deny responsibility often admit that they 
have to fight the appearance of responsibility in horrible criminals . . . The same 
pattern recurs for paradoxes in epistemology and ethics. Both sides of the debate 
usually feel the force of intuitions on the other side. These appearances . . . are 
                                                             
8
 Sinnott-Armstrong, however, notes that abstract cases do not always lead to abstract representations, 
nor do concrete cases always lead to concrete representations. For this reason, along with individual var-
iation and the fact that other factors such as the amount of affect-invoking content of cases will interact 
with the concreteness of the case, he says that “surveys responses will vary a lot, and only some of this 
variance will be explained by the dichotomoy between abstract and concrete” (p. 224). 
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just what one would expect if the philosophical intuitions come from distinct rep-
resentational systems. (2008; pp. 223-224)  
 
Mandelbaum and Ripley 
Mandelbaum and Ripley (ms) propose what they call the Norm Broken, Agent Respon-
sible (NBAR) theory of the abstract/concrete paradox. According to the NBAR theory, people 
hold the following unconscious belief: if a norm is broken, an agent is responsible.9 People use 
this belief as a heuristic when evaluating particular cases. In most concrete cases, a norm is 
clearly broken, and people tend to attribute responsibility to the agent. In most abstract cases, 
however, it is less clear that a norm is broken; thus, people are unlikely to attribute responsibil-
ity. Mandelbaum and Ripley believe that concreteness can be different from case to case, in-
cluding the mention of a specific agent, a specific action, being set in the actual world (ms; p. 1). 
So the NBAR theory appears to account for many10 of the putative instances of the ab-
stract/concrete paradox reviewed in Section 2.11 
                                                             
9
 Mandelbaum and Ripley use a wide conception of “norm” on which norms are, roughly, expectations, 
such as “whales don’t fly” and “philosophy professors shouldn’t beat their students for bad papers.” 
Mandelbaum and Ripley note that on their account, every belief (moral and non-moral) that someone has 
about how the world ought to be is a norm (fn. 6, p. 8). 
10
 Specifically, Mandelbaum and Ripley claim that NBAR theory can explain the results of Nichols and 
Knobe (2007), Nahmias et al. (2007), Roskies and Nichols (2008), and de Brigard et al. (2009). They do 
not mention Sinnott-Armstrong’s (2008) study. Nor do they mention Freiman and Nichols (2011), possibly 
because they were unaware of that study at the time of the most recent draft of their paper. 
11
 There are seemingly obvious counterexamples to the NBAR theory that Mandelbaum and Ripley con-
sider. They note that, for example, bad happenings—such as a tree blowing over in a storm and crushing 
someone’s baby—are situations in which a norm is broken, but an agent is not responsible. Bad happen-
ings thus appear to undermine the NBAR theory. However, Mandelbaum and Ripley reject this conclusion 
by appealing to cognitive dissonance theory, which states that someone holding inconsistent beliefs cre-
ates a negative motivational state in that person. This negative motivational state leads the person to ei-
ther reject the threatened belief or find a way to not view it as actually threatened, e.g., disregarding sali-
ent evidence. In cases of bad happenings, then, people can reject the belief that that happening is bad, 
reject NBAR, or decide that someone is responsible for the bad happening (10). Mandelbaum and Ripley 
claim that people will typically decide that someone is in fact responsible in this situation, rather than 
thinking their baby being crushed is not actually bad or rejecting NBAR (which they take to be a well-
entrenched heuristic) (10). 
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4 EVALUATION OF EXPLANATIONS OF THE PARADOX 
I have now reviewed a collection of experimental studies purportedly concerning what 
Sinnott-Armstrong has called the abstract/concrete paradox (Section 2) and presented the 
handful of proposed explanations of that paradox (Section 3). I will now evaluate the success of 
the candidate explanations of the abstract/concrete paradox and conclude that none of the ex-
isting explanations is successful. The purpose of this section is to set up my discussion in Sec-
tion 5, where I will highlight some general problems with the abstract/concrete literature and ar-
gue that the paradox has yet to be explained because theorists have mistakenly thought that 
there is a single phenomenon to be explained. I then discuss the implications of my critique for 
arguments about the reliability of intuitions in Section 6. 
Nichols and Knobe 
Nichols and Knobe’s (2008) affective performance error model makes the following pre-
diction: when people experience strong affective (or, more specifically, sufficiently strong affec-
tive) reactions when evaluating a scenario and deciding whether or not to attribute moral re-
sponsibility, they will withhold attributions of moral responsibility—this description just is the the-
sis of the affective performance error model. However, it is important to fully draw out the impli-
cations of this prediction. In particular, the model posits no special link between the concrete-
ness of the intuition-eliciting scenario and the level of responsibility attributed. Rather, the level 
of responsibility attributed to the actor in the scenario is mediated by the affective reaction expe-
rienced in response to the details of the scenario by the person making the attribution. In exper-
imental studies, concrete scenarios typically elicit higher attributions of responsibility than ab-
stract scenarios because the concrete scenarios are typically more affectively-laden than ab-
stract scenarios. The important point here is that the crucial link posited by the affective perfor-
mance error model runs between the person’s experience of affect and the functioning of their 
performance systems used to generate responsibility judgments. Thus, the affective perfor-
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mance error model makes the following prediction: affectively-primed subjects will attribute lev-
els of responsibility in response to low-affect abstract scenarios that are comparable to the lev-
els of responsibility they attribute in response to high-affect concrete scenarios.12 In other 
words, inducing a strong affective reaction, even if it does not come from the details of the intui-
tion-eliciting scenario, should increase responsibility attributions regardless of the concreteness 
or other details of the scenario. 
Here is one way to test this prediction: Prime people to engage in emotional pro-
cessing13 and then give them a low-affect abstract scenario. Nichols and Knobe’s affective per-
formance error model predicts increased attributions of responsibility for affectively-primed sub-
jects given a low-affect abstract scenario, compared to non-affectively-primed subjects given the 
same scenario. Likewise, affectively-primed subjects given a low-affect abstract scenario should 
respond similarly to non-affectively-primed subjects given high-affect concrete scenarios. 
A more sophisticated way to test this prediction is to look at clinical populations with def-
icits in emotional processing. If someone’s affective processing is disrupted, they should not ex-
                                                             
12
 This prediction may be blocked depending on how Nichols and Knobe’s presentation of the affective 
performance error model is read. They say that “people ordinarily make responsibility judgments by rely-
ing on a tacit theory, but when they are faced with a truly egregious violation of moral norms (as in our 
concrete cases), they experience a strong affective reaction which makes them unable to apply the theory 
correctly” (671). There are at least three ways to interpret the role of moral norms violations in the model. 
First, moral norms violations may be one example of the various ways in which the details of the intuition-
eliciting scenarios elicit a strong affective reaction (in addition to, e.g., affectively-laden words or phrases 
that do not refer to moral norms violations, such as “rotting cat corpse being eaten by maggots and cock-
roaches”). Second, moral norms violations may be the only way the scenarios elicit a strong affective re-
action. Third, moral norms violations may be the only way the scenarios elicit a strong affective reaction 
which leads to a performance error (as opposed to moral norms violations that elicit strong affective reac-
tions but do not disrupt the normal functioning of the performance systems). The prediction in question is 
compatible with the first two interpretations but incompatible with the third interpretation. Thus, Nichols 
and Knobe may block my prediction here (which, ultimately, creates problems for their model) if the role of 
moral norms violations in their model is intended to be read in the third way. However, in support of the 
affective performance error model, Nichols and Knobe appeal to the several findings in the broader social 
psychological literature on affect and cognition; those findings employ several ways in which affect may 
lead to performance errors (not merely through moral norms violations), so it appears that Nichols and 
Knobe assume something like the first interpretation. 
13
 Emotional processing could be induced using a variety of techniques including pictures, videos, or tac-
tile stimuli, among others. The International Affective Picture System—a standardized set of emotionally-
evocative, internationally accessible color photographs—is very common in studies of emotion and could 
be used here as well. See Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert (2008) for more details. Thanks to Billy Brady for 
this information. 
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hibit the performance errors in response to high-affect concrete scenarios predicted by the af-
fective performance error model. In other words, if affective reactions prevent the correct appli-
cation of people’s tacit theory of moral responsibility, then patients with affective-processing def-
icits should attribute roughly the same levels of responsibility in response to abstract and con-
crete scenarios. Cova, Bertoux, Bourgeois-Gironde, and Dubois (2012) tested this hypothesis 
using people with a behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), who have been 
shown to have reduced emotional processing. Nichols and Knobe’s affective performance error 
model predicts that people with bvFTD will attribute less responsibility to agents in concrete 
scenarios than people without bvFTD, since the affective content of typical concrete scenarios 
cannot disrupt the application of the bvFTD subjects’ tacit theory of moral responsibility. 
Cova et al. (2012) found that people with bvFTD were no less likely to attribute respon-
sibility to agents in concrete scenarios than people without bvFTD. The results of Cova et al.’s 
experiment are not compatible with Nichols and Knobe’s affective performance error model of 
the abstract/concrete paradox. Until evidence suggesting otherwise is provided or Cova et al.’s 
results are explained away,14 we have reason to reject the affective performance error model as 
an explanation of the abstract/concrete paradox in moral psychology. 
Sinnott-Armstrong 
Sinnott-Armstrong’s separate encoding capacities hypothesis is implausible for two rea-
sons. First, he provides little support for his claim that abstract and concrete scenarios15 are rep-
resented by semantic memory and episodic memory, respectively. By the same token, I can 
simply claim that abstract scenarios are encoded by episodic memory and concrete scenarios 
are encoded by semantic memory. He does claim that the separate capacities hypothesis, if 
                                                             
14
 There are at least a few possibilities for someone wishing to pursue this line. For example, they may 
highlight the very small sample size (10 subjects). Or they may argue that people with bvFTD are in fact 
left with sufficient emotional processing abilities to disrupt application of their tacit theory of moral respon-
sibility when given concrete cases.  
15
 Recall that for Sinnott-Armstrong, the abstract/concrete distinction can refer to a distinction between 
general and specific stimuli or a distinction between universal and particular stimuli. 
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true, would explain why pairs of paradoxical intuitions are common in philosophy—nearly16 eve-
ry person has both episodic and semantic memory, so if the separate capacities hypothesis 
were true, it would be unsurprising that philosophers often feel the force of both the intuitions 
constituting a paradox. However, this inference is false. Though the abstract/concrete paradox 
involves intuitions about abstract cases and intuitions about concrete cases, not all paradoxes in 
philosophy are constituted by an intuition about an abstract case and an intuition about a con-
crete case. Thus, the intuitions of some paradoxes many both be represented by semantic 
memory or by episodic memory. If the separate capacities hypothesis were true, we would not 
expect to feel the force of both intuitions of a paradox if those intuitions are both represented by 
the same memory system. Yet we do feel the force of both intuitions of many paradoxes that do 
not involve an abstract case and a concrete case. So Sinnott-Armstrong’s inference is false. 
Second, even if concrete scenarios were encoded by episodic memory, we should not 
expect anything resembling uniform judgments about concrete cases since each person’s ep i-
sodic memories are specific to that person—episodic memories represent specific episodes that 
an individual herself has experienced. Thus, unless most people’s episodic memories are suff i-
ciently similar, we should expect scenarios encoded in episodic memory to be processed quite 
differently by each person and, hence, we would have no reason to predict much uniformity in 
judgments to hypothetical cases. In particular, we have no good reason to predict, as Sinnott-
Armstrong’s hypothesis claims, increased attributions of moral responsibility, free will, and relat-
ed concepts in response to concrete cases. 
Mandelbaum and Ripley 
One problem for the NBAR theory concerns its limited scope. The NBAR theory offers 
an account of the abstract/concrete paradox in moral psychology based on the empirical as-
sumption that most people have a well-entrenched heuristic which they employ when making 
                                                             
16
 Sinnott-Armstrong cites cases of people with brain damage who have episodic memory but not seman-
tic memory and vise versa (Tulving 1989; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom 1996). 
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evaluations of responsibility. However, the limited scope—the domain-specificity—of the NBAR 
heuristic is problematic for the NBAR theory. For the Norm Broken, Agent Responsible theory 
cannot account for a large part (possibly even the majority) of the existing relevant data, since 
abstract/concrete differences have been found in judgments of concepts other than responsibil-
ity, including fairness, free will, desert, and knowledge (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008). Minimally, the 
NBAR theory must be revised and its scope broadened to account for much of the relevant da-
ta. 
A second problem for the NBAR theory concerns the wide conception of norm that it 
employs and the predictions that follow from that conception. On the NBAR theory, a norm is 
best conceived of as any kind of expectation, where “expectation” is construed as broadly as 
possible (16). The broad construal of expectation permits both moral and non-moral expecta-
tions to count as norms and leads to a bevy of predictions for the NBAR theory. For example, 
Mandelbaum and Ripley claim that “if traffic doesn’t swell at five, we predict that someone who 
had been expecting it to swell will look for an agent responsible for the lack of swelling” (16). 
Though some form of empirical testing would be needed to actually test that prediction of the 
NBAR theory and I can only provide my own intuition here, I doubt the average commuter ex-
pecting traffic to swell at five would look for an agent responsible for the lack of traffic swell.17  
                                                             
17
 I set aside the commuter prediction here somewhat quickly, and Mandelbaum and Ripley themselves 
only mention it in passing at the end of their paper as an example of a norm. But it is not wholly uninter-
esting to explore the first-person phenomenology of that case. In my own analogous case, when the train 
comes at the end of the day and it is not overcrowded, I typically assume that another train not normally 
scheduled was in service that day and cleared most of the passengers from the station immediately pre-
ceding my station. Perhaps in some non-obvious way I am attributing responsibility to some agent in this 
case (or maybe the unscheduled train counts as an agent). But my experience does not clearly indicate 
deployment of something like the NBAR heuristic. 
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5 GENERAL PROBLEMS WITH THE ABSTRACT/CONCRETE LITERATURE 
In Section 4 I argued that a satisfactory explanation of the abstract/concrete paradox has 
yet to emerge. In this section my goal is to highlight more general problems with some of the 
ways theorists have been thinking about the abstract/concrete literature. I will try to show that no 
satisfactory explanation is available because the experiments putatively looking at the ab-
stract/concrete paradox have actually been looking at several distinct phenomena mistakenly 
labeled as a single, unified phenomenon. There are several sources of confusion that have led 
researchers to mistakenly attribute the results of their empirical studies to a single phenomenon. 
First, there is no clear definition of abstract and concrete.  Sinnott-Armstrong says that 
“the slippery terms ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ can refer either to the dichotomy between universal 
and particular or to the separate dichotomy between general and specific (as well as to other 
dichotomies)” (2008; fn. 1). Freiman and Nichols distinguish between questions that are 
phrased abstractly and questions concerning a concrete individual (2011, p. 8). And de Brigard, 
Mandelbaum, and Ripley (2009) claim that their abstract condition is abstract because the sce-
nario does not specify the action that the agent commits. Creating more confusion and ambigui-
ty, Mandelbaum and Ripley state, “What concreteness is varies from case to case: sometimes it 
amounts to describing in more detail an action that had previously been left undescribed; some-
times asking about a particular case instead of a general case; sometimes asking about an ac-
tion happening in our world vs. one in an alternate universe; sometimes something else” (ms; 
p.1). Though these philosophers have treated the various studies all as instances of the ab-
stract/concrete paradox, it is clear that there is no standard definition or abstract and concrete. 
The various notions of abstract and concrete—e.g., whether a case mentions a specific agent or 
not, or whether it is set in the actual world or an alternate world, or whether an action is de-
scribed in more detail or less detail—pick out what seem to be very different variables. Thus, 
even if we tried to include all possible notions of abstract and concrete in one definition of ab-
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stract and concrete (perhaps via a large, disjunctive definition), many different cases that would 
count then as abstract (or concrete) could appear significantly different from each other. 
Another source of confusion surrounding the abstract/concrete paradox is the conflation 
of two distinctions: abstract/concrete and low-affect/high-affect. Whatever the preferred notions 
of abstract and concrete, the distinction between abstract cases and concrete cases will be dif-
ferent from the distinction between cases with little affect-invoking content and cases with lots of 
affect-invoking content (unless, of course, the abstract/concrete distinction is explicitly defined 
as the low-affect/high-affect distinction). Given that affective experiences can activate different 
psychological processes, experimental philosophers must control for the affect-invoking content 
of their cases in order to avoid getting spurious results. Nichols and Knobe’s (2007) case con-
flated this distinction, though they controlled for affective content in later experiments. De 
Brigard, Mandelbaum, and Ripley (2009) also conflate these two distinctions in their experiment, 
since the specific action in their concrete case, a man raping women, is heavily affectively-
laden. With such an action in the concrete case, it is difficult to separate effects from the con-
creteness of the scenario from effects due to the affect-invoking content of the scenario. 
A third source of confusion surrounding the paradox arises from the fact that philoso-
phers have overlooked differences in the lengths of their cases. Abstract and concrete cases 
can both be either very long or very short (or some length in between). For example, Nichols 
and Knobe’s abstract and concrete cases are both quite long, at over three full paragraphs, 
while Freiman and Nichols’ abstract case consists of just one sentence. The length of cases is 
important because it may affect how people process the scenario and probe. If an abstract case 
is long enough, it may include enough details—even if not about specific agents or specific ac-
tions—to, e.g., elicit affective reactions or other potentially biasing cognitive processes. In sum, 
using scenarios of different lengths can lead people to use different cognitive processes, even if 
those different scenarios all satisfy the definition of abstract or concrete. Scenario length is an 
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important variable for empirical surveys, and so far it has been overlooked by philosophers 
studying the abstract/concrete paradox. 
The preceding three concerns provide converging evidence of serious confusion sur-
rounding the abstract/concrete paradox. The debate appears to be quite a mess. Given that 
there is no standard definition of abstract or concrete, scenarios have not been controlled for 
their amount of affect-invoking content or length or judgment type, and also that many of the 
relevant findings have not been replicated, the best explanation of the abstract/concrete para-
dox is that there is no single phenomenon to be explained. The term abstract/concrete paradox 
may not refer to any particular phenomenon at all. It therefore is unsurprising that there is no 
good unifying explanation currently available for the various results discussed. There exists no 
satisfactory explanation of the paradox because there is no one phenomenon to be explained! 
There are several dimensions along which the scenarios used in studies concerning the ab-
stract/concrete paradox may vary. As shown in Figure 1, no single dimension captures all the 
studies; putative cases of the abstract/concrete paradox have varied across five dimensions: 
mention of a specific agent, mention of a specific action, a relatively high amount of affect-
invoking content, setting (the actual world or an alternate world), and mention of a specific agent 
or a specific action. None of those five dimensions captures all putative instances of the para-
dox, and each putative instance varies across at least two or more of those dimensions. 
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These concerns do not stop at the abstract/concrete paradox, however. Many of the 
problems surrounding the paradox are applicable to most, if not all, other projects within exper-
imental philosophy. Most experimental philosophy projects need not worry about providing pre-
cise definitions of abstract and concrete, nor do they need to worry about conflating the ab-
stract/concrete distinction with low-affect/high-affect or other distinctions.  But they must ensure 
that they way in which they present their hypothetical cases elicits intuitions about the phenom-
enon in question. This is especially important for studies attempting to replicate or expand upon 
previous experiments. As shown by the collection of studies on the abstract/concrete paradox, 
even seemingly insignificant changes in the language or length of a case can easily make it dif-
ficult to determine whether survey participants’ intuitions actually concern the relevant phenom-
enon trying to be replicated. 
6 EXPERIMENTS AND RELIABILITY OF INTUITION 
I began my discussion by noting several popular challenges to the reliability of intuitions 
and how they might be met. Appealing to conflicting intuitions and then claiming that conflicting 
intuitions are prevalent enough to think that a high percentage of intuitions are wrong seemed to 
be the best available route for the skeptic of the reliability of intuitions. And, conversely, making 
this same appeal and claiming that conflicting intuitions are not very common seemed to be a 
good way for proponents of appeals to intuitions to meet the skeptic’s best available cha l-
lenge.18 
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 Note that meeting the skeptic’s challenge to the reliability of intuitions does not tell us whether or not 
intuitions are reliable, nor what reliability entails. If conflicting intuitions are not common, we would have 
evidence suggesting only that the skeptic’s challenge to reliability from conflicting intuitions fails. To be 
clear, I do not think my discussion of the abstract/concrete paradox brings us any closer to understanding 
what reliability entails (though I discuss some alternative approaches to understanding reliability later in 
this section). I claim only that the abstract/concrete studies can be used to meet the skeptic’s challenge to 
reliability from conflicting intuitions. 
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Above I showed that philosophers claiming to study the abstract/concrete paradox have 
actually been studying several distinct phenomena. That conclusion holds important implications 
for debates about the reliability of intuitions. For if the abstract/concrete paradox referred to a 
single phenomenon, then the results of those empirical studies would support the skeptic’s chal-
lenge to reliability, since those studies would provide a large set of conflicting intuitions.19 But if 
the abstract/concrete paradox did not refer to a single phenomenon, then the results of those 
studies would favor the proponent of the reliability of intuition, since those studies would provide 
many instances of intuitions that do not conflict. 
Even if the results of empirical studies could be used to meet the skeptics’ challenge to 
the reliability of intuitions, that alone suggests only that intuitions are not unreliable. Those re-
sults alone would not help us get clear on what it means for an intuition to be reliable. One 
strategy for honing in on reliability is to distinguish between different kinds of intuitions and de-
fine one kind of intuition in such a way that those kinds of intuitions are always (seemingly) reli-
able, at least to some extent. For example, Kauppinen (2007) distinguishes surface intuitions 
and robust intuitions. Robust intuitions are intuitions that a competent speaker of the language 
would give in ideal conditions—free from distorting influences and other biases—based upon 
semantic considerations and not pragmatic considerations. Surface intuitions, on the other 
hand, are quick, gut reactions to cases that do not involve careful reflection on and considera-
tion of the details of the intuition-eliciting case and key concepts (2007, p. 103). This distinction 
between surface and robust intuitions might provide a useful first step in better understanding 
reliability, for if we can identify and isolate robust intuitions, we might be able to pull out the 
common properties of those intuitions in virtue of which they are reliable. 
                                                             
19
 As a reminder, by “conflicting intuitions” I mean conflicts that persist after possible verbal disagree-
ments and potentially distorting factors such as clouded emotions, biases, etc. have been accounted for. 
In those cases, two people have the same facts about the phenomenon in question but interpret them 
differently. As a result, one of the conflicting intuitions must be wrong (Goldman 2007). 
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However, Kauppinen’s distinction between surface intuitions and robust intuitions does 
not provide much help in getting clear on what reliability of intuitions entails. Robust intuitions 
may be more reliable than surface intuitions, but only because they are defined by Kauppinen 
as more reliable. Robust intuitions are intuitions that a competent speaker of the language might 
have under sufficiently ideal conditions. On this definition, robust intuitions are generally more 
reliable than surface intuitions since they are produced under ideal conditions—that is, ‘condi-
tions in which there are no perturbing, warping or distorting factors or limits of information, ac-
cess or ability’ (2007, p. 103). However, the problem with this account of intuitions, with respect 
to the debate about the reliability of intuitions, is that few, if any, intuitions studied by experi-
mental philosophers will be robust intuitions. Moreover, few, if any, professional philosophers’ 
intuition will be robust intuitions. For Kauppinen’s “sufficiently ideal conditions” are unlikely to be 
realized in most situations where intuitions are produced. (Perhaps professional philosophers 
can attain sufficiently ideal conditions when thinking through a hypothetical case in their arm-
chair, if they are aware of common biases that may affect intuitions and guard against them, but 
it is unlikely that the typical survey participant will be both aware of those common biases and 
careful enough to try to avoid them.) If Kauppinen’s conditions for robust intuitions are never 
satisfied or if they are only very rarely satisfied in experimental studies, then his distinction be-
tween surface intuitions and robust intuitions cannot inform the debate about the reliability of 
intuitions, since we will almost always be dealing with surface intuitions which do not help us get 
a grip on what it means for an intuition to be reliable. Other accounts of intuitions that include 
reliability as a part of the definition of intuition will also not be helpful for getting clear on reliabil-
ity. 
However, it may be possible to get a better grip on reliability by using something like 
Kauppinen’s general strategy of distinguishing between different kinds of intuitions. Perhaps re-
liability of intuition can be characterized by proper functioning under normal circumstances. The 
problem with this strategy is that it will be difficult to distinguish normal circumstances from ab-
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normal circumstances. It is unclear what the boundary is between normal and abnormal circum-
stances, and I suspect any attempts to define that boundary would be met with opposition. Con-
sider, for example, the notions of abstract and concrete. Those two terms may seem at first to 
be reasonably easy to define in a satisfactory way. But as the set of studies on the ab-
stract/concrete paradox show, that is not the case. It is actually quite difficult to define abstract 
and concrete in a satisfactory way—does affect-invoking content count, and if so, how much 
affect-invoking content counts? Does the mention of specific agents count as concrete, or must 
a case mention specific agents and specific actions? Demarcating normal and abnormal cir-
cumstances with respect to intuition-eliciting cases would be difficult as well. For the same 
questions concerning the demarcation of abstract and concrete must be answered along with 
many other questions. For example, does an intuition formed after discussing a case with a col-
league count as an intuition formed under normal circumstances, or not? Reliability of intuition 
cannot be defined as proper functioning under normal circumstances unless we have an ac-
cepted notion of normal circumstances, which will be difficult to produce. 
It is also possible to characterize reliability as proper functioning under a specific set of 
relevant possible cases. For example, we might characterize reliability as proper functioning in 
only cases set in the actual world or possible worlds some sufficiently close distance from the 
actual world. For perhaps we have reason to think that we only need intuitions about cases set 
in the actual world or close possible worlds, in which case intuition need only function properly 
in those cases. Even if intuition about cases set in distant possible worlds does not always func-
tion properly, this is not a strike against the reliability of intuition, since we only need intuition to 
function properly for cases set in the actual world or close possible worlds.  
However, characterizing reliability in this way suffers from the same problem as charac-
terizing proper functioning under normal circumstances. Characterizing reliability in this way 
does not solve the problem. It merely trades the problem of defining reliability for the problem of 
defining the set of relevant possible cases. And I see no easy way of satisfactorily defining the 
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set of relevant possible cases under which intuitions must function properly in order to be relia-
ble. Intuitions are used in a variety of ways in many different areas of philosophy. Determining 
the set of relevant possible cases to ground reliability of intuitions in general—that is, across all 
the ways intuitions are used and across all the areas of philosophy where intuitions are ap-
pealed to as evidence—will be a difficult task. 
7 CONCLUSION 
When we attend to the overlooked differences in survey materials used to study the ab-
stract/concrete paradox, we see that the paradox does not refer to a single phenomenon, con-
trary to what philosophers currently believe. It is therefore unsurprising that a satisfactory expla-
nation of the paradox has yet to emerge, since existing explanations are attempting to explain a 
handful of different phenomena mistakenly unified under the label “abstract/concrete paradox.”  
Consequently, the intuitions given in these studies do not actually conflict. They are 
simply different intuitions about different stimuli. These studies provide a large set of empirical 
data suggesting that conflicting intuitions, contra some skeptics about the reliability of intuitions, 
are not actually that common in the philosophical literature. If philosophers can overlook the im-
portant differences in materials used to study the abstract/concrete paradox, then philosophers 
may also overlook many other important differences in other areas of the philosophical litera-
ture. In that case, conflicting intuitions given in response to cases seemingly concerning the 
same phenomenon may only be apparently conflicting intuitions. And if many of the conflicting 
intuitions in the philosophical literature are only apparent conflicts, then the percentage or wrong 
intuitions may be quite low. This is an important empirical fact, since the best available way for 
skeptics about intuitions to challenge the reliability of intuitions turns on the empirical question of 
whether wrong intuitions are common. If philosophers attend more carefully to the details of 
their hypothetical cases used to elicit intuitions, they may find that their intuitions do not actually 
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conflict very often at all. Thus, the most promising challenge to the reliability of intuition may be 
able to be met by more careful consideration of what phenomena hypothetical cases actually 
refer to. But even if this challenge is met and it cannot be shown that intuitions are unreliable, 
future work will need to provide a careful analysis of the notion of reliability and a positive argu-
ment for the reliability of intuitions. 
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